		10.3.4 Path-Switching Causation	324
		10.3.5 Temporal Preemption	325
	10.4	Conclusions	327
11	Refle	ections, Elaborations, and Discussions with Readers	331
	11.1	Causal, Statistical, and Graphical Vocabulary	331
		11.1.1 Is the Causal-Statistical Dichotomy Necessary?	331
		11.1.2 <i>d</i> -Separation without Tears (Chapter 1, pp. 16–18)	335
	11.2	Reversing Statistical Time (Chapter 2, p. 58–59)	337
	11.3	Estimating Causal Effects	338
		11.3.1 The Intuition behind the Back-Door Criterion	
		(Chapter 3, p. 79)	338
		11.3.2 Demystifying "Strong Ignorability"	341
		11.3.3 Alternative Proof of the Back-Door Criterion	344
		11.3.4 Data vs. Knowledge in Covariate Selection	346
		11.3.5 Understanding Propensity Scores	348
		11.3.6 The Intuition behind <i>do</i> -Calculus	352
		11.3.7 The Validity of <i>G</i> -Estimation	352
	11.4	Policy Evaluation and the <i>do</i> -Operator	354
		11.4.1 Identifying Conditional Plans (Section 4.2, p. 113)	354
		11.4.2 The Meaning of Indirect Effects	355
		11.4.3 Can $do(x)$ Represent Practical Experiments?	358
		11.4.4 Is the $do(x)$ Operator Universal?	359
		11.4.5 Causation without Manipulation!!!	361
		11.4.6 Hunting Causes with Cartwright	362
		11.4.7 The Illusion of Nonmodularity	364
	11.5	Causal Analysis in Linear Structural Models	366
		11.5.1 General Criterion for Parameter Identification	
		(Chapter 5, pp. 149–54)	366
		11.5.2 The Causal Interpretation of Structural Coefficients	366
		11.5.3 Defending the Causal Interpretation of SEM (or, SEM	
		Survival Kit)	368
		11.5.4 Where Is Economic Modeling Today? – Courting	
		Causes with Heckman	374
		11.5.5 External Variation vs. Surgery	376
	11.6	Decisions and Confounding (Chapter 6)	380
		11.6.1 Simpson's Paradox and Decision Trees	380
		11.6.2 Is Chronological Information Sufficient for	
		Decision Trees?	382
		11.6.3 Lindley on Causality, Decision Trees, and Bayesianism	384
		11.6.4 Why Isn't Confounding a Statistical Concept?	387
	11.7	The Calculus of Counterfactuals	389
		11.7.1 Counterfactuals in Linear Systems	389
		11.7.2 The Meaning of Counterfactuals	391
		11.7.3 <i>d</i> -Separation of Counterfactuals	393

xii

Contents

11.8	Instrumental Variables and Noncompliance	395	
	11.8.1 Tight Bounds under Noncompliance	395	
11.9	More on Probabilities of Causation	396	
	11.9.1 Is "Guilty with Probability One" Ever Possible?	396	
	11.9.2 Tightening the Bounds on Probabilities of Causation	398	
Epilogue T A pub	he Art and Science of Cause and Effect lic lecture delivered November 1996 as part of		
the UC	CLA Faculty Research Lectureship Program	401	
Bibliography			
Name Index		453	
Subject Index			

Reflections, Elaborations, and Discussions with Readers

As X-rays are to the surgeon, graphs are for causation. The author

In this chapter, I reflect back on the material covered in Chapters 1 to 10, discuss issues that require further elaboration, introduce new results obtained in the past eight years, and answer questions of general interest posed to me by readers of the first edition. These range from clarification of specific passages in the text, to conceptual and philosophical issues concerning the controversial status of causation, how it is taught in classrooms and how it is treated in textbooks and research articles.

The discussions follow roughly the order in which these issues are presented in the book, with section numbers indicating the corresponding chapters.